Florida Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 4

Article 5

December 1954

The Lawyer's Duties to His Clients
Owen J. Roberts

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Owen J. Roberts, The Lawyer's Duties to His Clients, 7 Fla. L. Rev. 413 (1954).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol7/iss4/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Roberts: The Lawyer's Duties to His Clients

DATE DOWNLOADED: Thu Sep 8 12:24:11 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Owen J. Roberts, The Lawyer's Duties to his Clients, 7 U. FLA. L. REV. 413 (1954).
ALWD 7th ed.
Owen J. Roberts, The Lawyer's Duties to his Clients, 7 U. Fla. L. Rev. 413 (1954).
APA 7th ed.
Roberts, O. J. (1954). The lawyer's duties to his clients. University of Florida Law
Review, 7(4), 413-424.
Chicago 17th ed.
Owen J. Roberts, "The Lawyer's Duties to his Clients," University of Florida Law
Review 7, no. 4 (Winter 1954): 413-424
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Owen J. Roberts, "The Lawyer's Duties to his Clients" (1954) 7:4 U Fla L Rev 413.
AGLC 4th ed.
Owen J. Roberts, 'The Lawyer's Duties to his Clients' (1954) 7(4) University of
Florida Law Review 413
MLA 9th ed.
Roberts, Owen J. "The Lawyer's Duties to his Clients." University of Florida Law
Review, vol. 7, no. 4, Winter 1954, pp. 413-424. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Owen J. Roberts, 'The Lawyer's Duties to his Clients' (1954) 7 U Fla L Rev 413
Provided by:
University of Florida / Lawton Chiles Legal Information Center
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1954

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [1954], Art. 5

THE LAWYER'S DUTIES TO HIS CLIENTS
OwE

J. RoBERTS*

We are to talk about the branch of legal ethics that deals with
the duties of a lawyer to his client. I like to go back to bedrock when
I talk about a thing, and so I went to the Oxford Dictionary to confirm what I thought I knew - the meaning of ethics. That volume defines ethics as "the science of morals" and then adds, "It is that branch
of learning which deals with the duties of human beings."
The very word "morals" implies that you and I are set apart from
the rest of creation. Nobody would think of discussing the morals of
a dog or of a horse. Psychology leads us to think that a number of
the higher animals have a process that is akin to the thinking process
of human beings, but nobody suggests that a dog or a horse has a
spiritual nature or that there is something instilled in the animal
teaching him what is right, and what is wrong. A dog or horse may
know from experience that if he does a certain act he will be whipped.
The attempt to avoid physical harm may keep him from doing the
act, but no one attributes to the animal a moral nature. We, of all
creation, have attributed to us a moral quality.
What do we mean when we talk of ethics as a sense of moral duty?
We mean that towards our fellow man in various relations a right
thinking - something that comes from within, some sort of natural
law - tells us what is permissible and what is not permissible; it tells
us that this is a breach of duty and that is a fulfillment of duty. Of
course, this theory of a moral imperative runs through the whole of
society and life. Whatever the relation is - that of child to parent, of
sister to brother, of lawyer to lawyer, or of a member of society to
another member-each relationship involves duties. Out of this
complexity of relationships grows a sort of classification that this is
done and that is not done; that this is right and that is wrong. After
all, the last supreme court on these questions is a person's conscience.
When we talk about legal ethics we merely mean the relationship
between a lawyer and his client that adds something to the lawyer's
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duties as a citizen. A lawyer, with everybody else in a community,
owes a duty to be interested in community politics. He owes a duty
to think about the poor, the oppressed, and the downtrodden. He
owes a duty as a citizen to do many things that are not at all peculiar
to the lawyer, but equally to the doctor, to the business man, or to
anybody else. But as the doctor and the clergyman in their relationships to their patients or their penitents assume a certain number of
peculiar and special duties, so the lawyer assumes certain peculiar
relationships when he undertakes this great responsibility of speaking
for or becoming the alter ego and representative of his client. These
duties are no different in quality from the duties of any other man
to his client or customer; they are merely addressed to the peculiar
relationship of the lawyer to his client.
So I have always had grave doubts about two things. First, I
doubt that a code like your own legal ethics code of Florida or the code
of the American Bar Association or any other would do much, if anything, to improve the ethics of the bar. And, second, I have grave
doubt whether a course in legal ethics, even such an interesting one
as you saw exhibited today, would do much good.
Judge Clark told you why he began teaching what he did in the
Yale Law School. When I came back from the Supreme Court and
was catapulted by a curious set of circumstances into the office of Dean
of the University Law School at Pennsylvania, the faculty told me that
a number of states in which our graduates practice require a certificate
that they have had a course in legal ethics. Since nobody else would
teach such a course, the faculty told me that I would have to do so.
I did, or I tried to, and had a very unsatisfactory experience.
I examined all the case books and text books on the subject. None
seemed to be adequate. I finally conducted a course based largely on
the canons of the American Bar Association, discussing with the young
ladies and gentlemen one canon after another in a series of semiseminar meetings, but I felt that it was rather hollow. After all,
if the Pennsylvania Bar or the Florida Bar were composed only of
really sensitive, moral characters, you would need no code of ethics.
And I am not sure that you can teach ethics, conscience, moral character to anybody.
The colleges are faced with the problem today. How are you going
to teach ethics to young men and women as part of a college course?
Some colleges have; my own college has three men teaching religion Catholic, Jew, and Protestant. I do not think you can teach religion
that way. Then they have a super-professor of religion who deals with
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religious traditions, and so on.
Now - think back to your own experience - how does a college
student get his conception of what is right? Well, I know how I received mine. It was from my childhood associates who were brought
up in homes around me and from sitting around the lamp at night
and hearing my parents talk. I somehow absorbed a concept of what
is good and what is bad. I acquired it from going to church and
Sunday school, and during my years at college by observing the rugged
characters of the men who taught me. I had a tremendous admiration
for the quality and character of the men under whom I sat; and I
have a feeling, old as I am, that often today I am living with the
man who taught me Latin, the man who taught me Greek, and the
man who taught me philosophy in college sixty-odd years ago.
In the same way I studied at law school under George Wharton
Pepper, whom you all know. Could any man sit under George Wharton Pepper without absorbing a certain height, a certain elevation of
view, a certain concept of life? I sat under George Mifflin Dallas, then
a district judge of impeccable character. I sat under other men like
him and, of course, I wanted to be like those men.
Now these are intangibles, and these are the intangible things
that make character irrespective of how many grievance committees
you have or how many codes you have. If you have a bar that is
trying to sneak by, cutting the corners of the code as dose as it can,
then you do not have a bar of character; you do not have an ethical
bar. One of the things that always amuses me about questions put
to the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances is that fhe
man who puts a question often is setting himself over against hiis
client and wondering if he could edge up that far and get the approval of the Committee. I think a rule for a lawyer on any question
between himself and his dient is: "If I have any doubt, I should
abstain." In other words, if you have a doubt concerning the way to
serve your client, or you are called on to do something, or you can
take some position with your client, by the very fact that it raises a
doubt in your mind you will sleep better if you resolve that doubt
against yourself and in favor of your client.
If a man by training, as a result of his experiences, his father,
his mother, his associates, has formed a character, then you have the
best bulwark against violations of the rules of ethics. You do not need
any rules.
What is the difference between the aspects of legal ethics on
which I speak and other ethics? As I said, a rule, an ethical rule,
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arises out of a duty, and that duty arises out of a relationship. We
are now to discuss the relationship between the lawyer and his client
and what duties arise out of that relationship.
I have heard a good deal of talk about duties; I have seen a good
deal of the bar when it practices; and I have read Mr. Drinker's book.
A great foundation, desiring a book on that subject, asked him if he
would contribute it. They agreed to pay the expense of the secretarial and stenographic work involved. Mr. Drinker as a consequence
made this contribution to the bar of the United States. He will never
be compensated for the effort made except by your gratitude and the
gratitude of others.
Even in Mr. Drinker's book I do not find what I think is the
fundamental ethical duty of a lawyer in relation to his client. Can
you guess what this duty is? It is that he give the last ounce he has
to that client's case. I have wept to see cases thrown away in court
by a lawyer who was willing to gamble his client's case on inadequate
preparation.
When a lawyer undertakes this great fiduciary relation of becoming
a spokesman and alter ego, he also undertakes a duty not to let his
client down. Nobody polices him. Nobody looks over his shoulder.
There is nobody to goad him but his own conscience. I have often
wondered how some lawyers can sleep at night after throwing away
a client's case by not having thought it through adequately. I have
seen cases thrown away, as you have, over and over again, by a lawyer
who goes into court to try to get through on his own smartness and
quickness. He thinks he can succeed this way when he has not gone
to the bottom of the case, but some fellow who has gone to the bottom
throws him out of court. To give the last ounce to the case is the
first duty of a lawyer to his client.
The second duty is to make himself, at least for the time being,
his client's friend. The lawyer should make his client feel a confidence
in him because he realizes the wrong that his client has suffered. He
should make the client realize that the lawyer is dedicated to the
client's interest whether he wins or loses. If he does this, he will be
the client's friend, and the client will be his friend irrespective of the
outcome of the case.
The foregoing are two basic aspects of the cardinal duty that arises
out of the fiduciary relationship of lawyer and client. Of course it
is a fiduciary relation. It is a relation in which the client puts himself in the hands of the lawyer. The lawyer must put himself in the
other's dress for the purposes of the case. And what comes out of it?
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There comes out of it the duty never to betray the consummate trust
that the client has placed in the lawyer.
In reading books on legal ethics concerning problems of the
lawyer's fiduciary relations it seems to me, as the good Dean said
today, that you are chasing a foregone conclusion. Let me put it to
you this way. Suppose some elderly lady sent for you to draw her
will. She had confidence in you, but you knew she was a little weak in
her mind. You treated her very politely and quietly slipped in a
suggestion that she leave you $10,000, and she did. Would you like
to go the next day and tell your brethren of the bar exactly what
occurred at that interview? If you would not like to do it, you would
know that you had violated a principle of ethics. I do not think
any of you need to read the paragraph in Mr. Drinker's book saying
that it is not an ethical thing to do.
Or suppose a client comes to you and tells you his story, and you
say, "I will take your case. I think we can win." And then you say
to yourself, "Now as a result of what he told me, I think I can go
around to a broker's office and put in an order and make quite a little."
You would not like to tell your friends you had done that, would you?
You would keep it very dark. You would have taken advantage of
that confidence for your own profit, unbeknown to your client. You
would not like to testify to that. But is not that the test? If what you
do is something that you can tell, something that you need not conceal
and need not fear to have known, then on the whole you have lived
up to the standard of legal ethics that both your client and your
community expect of you. If you have any doubt about it, as I have
said once before, always construe the doubt against yourself and in
favor of your client, and I think you will not go wrong.
Now all of us have made mistakes. I have made mistakes in the
moral positions that I have taken at the bar. I am sorry, but I have
done it. But it is not a question of whether you or I have made mistakes. It is a question of what our motives were. If our intentions
were to do the right thing - and in a difficult decision we have had to
decide one way or the other - and if our motives were pure, our actions
were excusable though our judgment was wrong.
The interesting thing about this question of ethics is that the
duties belonging to a given relationship are never frozen. Other
situations will always arise entailing a new set of duties. Mr. Drinker's
book illustrates many of those situations. A client comes to you and
confides in you in a criminal case. We all agree not only that it
would be a dirty trick to disclose what he has told you in confidence
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but that your duty forbids it. Suppose, however, he tells you that he
is going to burn down the courthouse or that he is going to commit
another murder that afternoon. Now what is your duty? It is obvious.
Your duty to the community rises above your duty to your client. You
have two conflicting duties; which is superior? Suppose someone has
committed a fraud and is going to take advantage of it, and he tells
you that he is going to carry that fraud into court. Is it not your duty
to warn the judge that this man is purposely taking advantage of the
court? In many instances public duty rises above your duty to the
client. I think anybody can see that in the whole field of ethics there
are certain duties owed to the community that are higher than those
owed to an individual.
Lawyers are most often criticized by the public because a great
deal of "hooey" surrounds the duty not to disclose confidential communications and the duty to represent a person even though you suspect that he is guilty.
First, the question of suspicion of guilt. What should you do if
you suspect that your client is guilty? I hold a very interesting and
exciting experience in my own memory about this. It involves one of
the most ethical lawyers I ever knew, a man who practiced principally
in the criminal courts. He was a gentleman, and his practice consisted of appearing at the central police station every morning and
gathering in clients who were without representation. He would take
a coat or a watch or any article of value, and then he would come in
and defend in a most ethical way -I never knew him to resort to
trickery in my life. One day when I was trying cases for the prosecution a defendant was charged with attempting to pick pockets in
Philadelphia. He was a splendid looking man, well dressed, beautifully groomed, about thirty-five years of age, and my friend was
representing him. Two police officers testified that there was a big
crowd on Market Street, a parade was going on, that they had seen
this fellow reach into a man's coat for his watch, and that they had
arrested him. That was all the testimony they gave.
My friend put his client, the defendant, on the stand. He spoke
in perfect English. He was most deferential and courteous. He said
that he lived in the South, and that he had been going to Boston on
a trip. He had an old friend in Philadelphia and had stopped over
to see him. He had an hour or so in Philadelphia and was walking
around looking at the parade when the two officers arrested him. He
had done nothing illegal.
Without hesitation, the jury acquitted him. Later I told my friend
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that his client was certainly a very plausible gentleman and that it
looked as if the police had the wrong man. He said, "I had a funny
thing happen to me after he was released and we were walking down
the corridor. I took out my watch, which is quite old, and looked at it.
My client, noting the poor condition of my watch, said to me, 'Well,
you just wait until the next parade. I'll get you a good one.'"
Of course that lawyer was entitled to represent that man; he did
not suspect him of being a pickpocket. I suppose, however, he would
still be entitled to represent him if he had been caught picking someone's pocket, because the presumption of innocence is always present.
Another case demonstrating these two principles involved the
nephew of an important client of mine. My client brought the boy to
my office where I could talk to him alone. I said to the boy, whom I
will call Biles, "Tell me what your trouble is." He just looked at me.
He was a hard-looking citizen. He said, "I don't trust you." "Well," I
said, "this is in the confidence of my closet; you can tell me anything
here, and I am under a duty never to disclose it." I must have talked to
him about my relation as an attorney, and what not, for twenty
minutes. Finally he said, "I go to college. My mother is in the West.
She has an apartment in West Philadelphia.. I occupied it during my
vacations. I asked a fellow at school to come and spend the Easter
vacation with me at the apartment. He had done me dirt, and I was
going to get square with him, so I asked him to spend a few days in
my apartment. He wrote me a letter and said he'd come. I tore it up
and put it in the incinerator, which isn't working, and the police have
it and pieced it together, so they know he was visiting me."
"What has that got to do with it?" I asked him.
"Well," he said, "I wanted to get even. He did me this dirty trick,
and I intended to plug him for it. I had arranged to go out to a
suburb. I knew where there was a dark place out there, and I was
going to take him out there to that dark place and pound him and
leave him there."
"Well," I said, "what did you do?"
He said, "I took him out in the automobile. I had another friend
who had come out from college, and he wanted to go along, so I took
him along, and he sat in the back seat. When we got out there, I
opened the front of the car and went out to look over the place and
told these fellows to sit still until I got back. When I got back, this
fellow was shot through the head, and my pal had shot him, and I
asked him why he did it. He said he got nervous, and he thought
he had better make him sit still, so he shot him. He and I took the
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body up in the bushes and put his overcoat over him, and then we
beat it."
I said, "You're telling me that your friend did this. What did he
do it with?"
He replied, "We took along a pistol and that was what he used."
I asked him whose pistol it was, and he replied, "Mine." "Well," I
said, "Young man, you are in the deepest trouble I can think of, and
I have made it a rule for many years not to take criminal cases. I
want to send you to Mr. X, who was in law school with me, whom
your uncle knows, and who I think is the best criminal lawyer in
Philadelphia. Go to him at once."
So I called in the uncle and told him to take the boy over to Mr.
X and pay whatever retainer he might ask, that his nephew was in
very serious trouble. I felt I just could not take the case. So they went.
Now I come to the interesting part of the story. The police, of
course, were looking for Biles. They had found his car, the front
seat and the door covered with blood. They had found it the day
after I had sent Biles to Mr. X. They had found it parked on a street
in Germantown. They also found Biles' fingerprints on the car and
the dead man's fingerprints. There was the pistol; the keys were in
the car.
It was obvious to me that was planned by Mr. X., to whom I had
sent Biles. Evidently he had directed Biles not to alter the evidence
in any way. Two or three days later Mr. X walked into the central
station and asked if the police were looking for Biles. He was told
that they were. "Well," he said to the Chief, "I'll surrender him on
the condition that you take him immediately to prison; he is not to
talk to anyone whatsoever. We will waive a hearing, and he is to be
committed to prison immediately to await trial." The chief of detectives said, "Of course, I'll do that." "All right," Mr. X said, "meet
me at 2:00 o'clock at the monument in the park."
At 2.00 o'clock there were Biles and his attorney. The detectives
arrested him and took him before the city hall magistrate. Mr. X
walked to the bar and said, "The warrant is for first degree murder,
and we waive a hearing. Commit him to prison immediately."
The lawyer waited to see him put in the van, and then he had a
letter delivered to the warden of the county prison stating that he
represented this man and that nobody was to speak to him without
the attorney's consent. The letter continued, "He is not to leave
your custody until he goes to his trial, if he is ordered to trial by the
grand jury. You know your duty, and I expect you to observe it." This

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1954

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [1954], Art. 5
DUTIES TO CLIENTS
letter was served on the warden.

Later the lawyer heard that his client was up in the district attorney's office and that they were trying to question him. He went at
once into the criminal court with a petition to have his client sent
back to the county prison. The judge, who had been on the bench
for years, said, "Nonsense, Mr. X, they send for them all the time
and question them - have been doing it for years."
"It's illegal. He stays in the custody of the warden of the prison
until he comes in for trial," Mr. X said.
They argued for about an hour; then finally the judge threw up
his hands and said, "There is no right to bring him into the district
attorney's office for questioning -send him back to prison. That's
where he belongs. You can't question him."
They sent him back. Then they put a stool pigeon in with him,
but he said nothing to the stool pigeon.
He came to trial without having told the authorities anything.
They had the letter to show that young Biles had invited the dead boy
to spend some time in his apartment. There was no evidence as to
how long he was there, whether they spent the night in question there,
where Biles' car was before it was found. The only evidence was that
this was Biles' car, that it was covered with human blood, that the
blood was of the same quality as that of the deceased, that there was
a bullet hole through his head, and that the slug came from Biles'
pistol.
When the Commonwealth had put on its case, Mr. X moved for a
directed verdict, claiming that the corpus delicti had not been established and that the state had not proved that it was not an accident
or suicide. The lawyer argued that the wound was where a man
could have inflicted it himself; his hair was burned because the shot
was so close. The state had proved only the death and nothing more.
The judge scoffed at the argument; he was bitter about it. It took
two hours, but finally one of the toughest judges in Philadelphia
surrendered and said, "Mr. District Attorney, you have not proved the
corpus delicti. I will have to direct a verdict."
Was Mr. X unethical in anything he had done? I did not believe
the story that Biles had told about his friend going along with him
and, while Biles was up there in the woods, shooting the deceased. I
found afterwards that Mr. X did not believe that story either. But
was he to judge whether that story was true? Moreover, if the Commonwealth could not establish the corpus delicti, the state was not
entitled to go into evidence concerning Biles until it had proved that
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a crime had been committed. Did the lawyer do any more than his
duty in making the Commonwealth come up to scratch, no matter
what he thought about it? I think it was a perfectly clear case of
proper action by Mr. X.
About two or three months later we all saw in the Philadelphia
papers that this boy, Biles, had run his car into a tree somewhere
north of Tijuana, Mexico, and killed himself. Two or three days
later Mr. X, my friend, came to see me. He said, "You saw that
Biles is dead?" I replied, "Yes, probably good riddance to the community."
He then asked me if Biles had told me that story about his friend
riding with him that night and shooting the deceased while Biles was
not in the car. I told him that Biles had told it to me. He asked, "Did
you believe it?" I said, "No."
Now, was the lawyer not entitled to make whatever defense he
could for Biles, whether he believed it, or whether I believed it? Why
should a lawyer, in place of a judge and jury, judge the case?
Then he said, "That raises a question that has made me unable to
sleep." I said, "What is that?" He said, "From something that Biles
dropped in his story to me, I think I could have located that third
party, if there was such a person, who was with him and who he said
did the shooting." I said, "You do?" He said, "Yes." This lawyer was
as smart as a steel trap, and Biles had just dropped a word in his story
that had made him discern a trail. He said, "I think I could have
found that man and determined whether or not he was in that car
that night, and whether or not Biles' story was true. Do you think
it is my duty now to go to the district attorney and tell him what I
think?" I told him, "No." I said, "Whatever Biles told you was in
the confidence of your closet, and this change in circumstances does
not call for you to open your mouth,"
I think I was wrong. I fear I carried the principle of confidential
communication too far. Mr. X had a duty to keep Biles' confidence
for the sake of the client. But Biles was then dead, and I now think
that it was X's duty to go to the authorities, because he could not do
Biles any harm. Some harm might have been done to the reputation
of a deceased client but not to that of a living client.
These are two illustrations of the requirements of the ethics of
the bar - that you shall not prejudge your client's case, and that you
shall give that client not only a trial on the merits but a trial in which
you take advantage of the statute of limitations, or of any other statute,
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and the law as to corpus delicti, or any other principle of the common
law you can invoke.
As I say, I think I made a mistake in that case. I have no doubt
made other mistakes in judging between myself and my client, but
I have always tried to keep my motives pure, and I think that is the
thing about which we should all think. It is important to a lawyer,
as one great lawyer once said to me, not only to do right but always
to appear to do right. You owe that to yourself and to the community.
There has been some talk about the lawyer and his client concerning fees. Well, if you are going downtown to buy a watch, it is
entirely within the morals of the transaction for the seller of the watch
to attempt to sell at the highest possible price and for you to try to
purchase the watch at cheaply as possible. The fact is, I feel, that in
this fiduciary relation to your client you must not bargain with him.
When I was active at the bar, a very large segment of the bar was
engaged principally in personal injury cases. Many went out and
procured the cases, and those of us who were not specialists in that
line did not get a great many personal injury cases. Every once in a
while by some mischance, however, one would come into my office,
and in most cases it was a person who was poor and could not advance
fees. If you did not get a recovery the client probably could not pay
anything. So it happened, as it probably is true here today, that the
chance of being paid was very small unless you were awarded the
verdict. Well, I wrestled with my conscience about what I should
do. There was usually a contingent agreement, and under the practice then in Philadelphia that agreement either called for one third or
one half and the client was billed for the expenses out of his share.
I thought that was unconscionable, and I did not know what I should
do. I took the course, maybe out of prudence, maybe out of honesty I will take it either way - that I would rather not be accused of overcharging clients.
I said to all these clients, "If you can raise the costs, the $5.00 or so
to have a writ issued and served, I will represent you, and I will make
no agreement with you. If you get a verdict, come in here, and we
will talk about what is fair and fix the fee." I never had an argument.
And I did not take a third of the verdict, but I lived comfortably with
myself, and I had no sense of having dealt harshly with my clients.
It was almost the universal practice of our office to submit a tentative fee or discussion of a fee in matters of any size, and we did not
find the clients hardfisted or mean. You run across such a client every
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once in a while, but for every one you run across you find another full
of gratitude for what you have done and glad to give a generous, fair
fee for your services.
I say that to me this whole topic of legal ethics adds up to simply
this: make up your mind that you will do the right thing with your
client, and if there is any doubt about what the right thing is resolve
that doubt in your client's favor. If you do this, you will probably
not have any of these finespun technical difficulties that the paragraphs
in the American Bar Association Journal reveal every month. Those
fine-print paragraphs are usually, as I say, motivated by an attorney
desiring to charge more than he himself feels is just. Thus he proposes the question to determine if he can secure committee approval.
I think he should not, but rather resolve the doubt in favor of the
client.
And now a practical word. I come from the city where Ben
Franklin published, and I know that Ben said, "Honesty is the best
policy." If he were speaking to a lawyer, I am sure he would have
said that, as respects the clients, "Liberality is the best policy. If in
doubt, abstain."
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